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Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare
and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions


Adam Chodorow

This Article considers two unrelated tax provisions—health care
Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) and the charitable deduction. FSAs
permit eligible taxpayers to set income aside tax-free to use for medical
expenses. However, these accounts have a “use-it-or-lose-it” feature that
discourages participation and creates incentives for unnecessary
spending at year-end. The charitable deduction is available only to those
who itemize their deductions, thus negating the incentive to give for the
65% of taxpayers who take the standard deduction. Prior attempts to fix
these provisions separately—allowing taxpayers to roll over unused FSA
amounts to the next year and moving some or all of the charitable
deduction “above the line”—have failed.
I propose combining the two provisions by allowing taxpayers to
donate unused FSA amounts to charity. Doing so would lower a key
impediment to participation in FSAs while giving a functional abovethe-line deduction (and relief from payroll taxes) to those who donate
through this mechanism. Not only would this reform increase the
efficacy of both provisions, but it should also avoid many of the pitfalls of
prior stand-alone reform efforts.
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University, Tempe, Arizona. I would like to thank Ellen Aprill, Miranda Fleischer, Brian Galle,
and the participants at the University of Illinois faculty workshop, the University of San
Diego’s Tax Speaker Series, and the Boston College Tax Policy Workshop for comments on
earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to thank Mark Molique for his outstanding help as a
research assistant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing national debate over health care reform has
revealed a deep divide over how best to promote social welfare.
Regardless of this debate’s outcome, one thing seems certain: tax
incentives will remain an important tool in advancing health care
policy. The insurance mandate and associated penalty have received
the lion’s share of media attention, yet a number of other provisions
play an important role in encouraging individuals to acquire health
insurance, save for their medical needs, and monitor their
expenditures. In this article, I focus on health care flexible spending
accounts (FSAs),1 which permit taxpayers to set aside money tax-free
for medical needs.
Largely ignored by legal academics,2 FSAs loom large in the
minds of those eligible to participate. Before each tax year begins,
taxpayers must estimate their unreimbursed medical expenses for the
upcoming year.3 If they choose to participate, they must make an
irrevocable election to set aside money to cover such expenses on a
tax-free basis. FSAs are subject to a “use-it-or-lose-it” rule. Thus, if
taxpayers overestimate their needs, they must either race to spend
unused amounts on items they would not otherwise have purchased
or forfeit those amounts to their employer.
As discussed more fully below, although most taxpayers consider
FSAs to be a form of tax-favored savings account, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) considers them to be a form of health
insurance. Many of the rules that make FSAs so ineffective, such as
the use-it-or-lose-it rule, can be explained in large part by this fact.
No data exists regarding how much time and energy taxpayers spend
trying to assess their anticipated medical expenses, how many
taxpayers underfund their accounts, or how many spend unused
money at year-end to avoid forfeiture. However, of the

1. As described, see infra note 31, the rules provide for both health care and dependent
care FSAs, which allow taxpayers to set aside money tax-free to be used for dependent care
expenses. Unless otherwise indicated, I use FSA in this article to refer to health care FSAs.
2. As described more fully later, see infra Part II.C, there is a growing body of
economics literature assessing the efficacy of FSAs as a health policy tool.
3. For a description of the rules governing health care FSAs, see Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,957–60 (Aug. 6, 2007).
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approximately 40% of U.S. employees eligible for such accounts,
only 22%—about 8% of all U.S. employees—participate in FSAs.4
The charitable deduction is also viewed by many as being deeply
flawed. Some criticize the deduction because it provides an “upsidedown” subsidy, where high-income taxpayers receive a greater
benefit than low-income taxpayers.5 Others focus on the fact that
some taxpayers are allowed to deduct the full market value of
donated property while others are limited to deducting basis.6
However, the issue that has received the most attention has been the
placement of the deduction “below the line,” so that it is not
available to the approximately 65% of taxpayers who take the
standard deduction.7
To date, stand-alone efforts to fix the perceived problems with
these provisions—by allowing taxpayers to roll unused amounts over
to the next year and by moving some or all of the charitable
deduction “above the line”—have failed.8 In this Article, I propose a
novel solution that merges the two provisions by allowing taxpayers
to donate unused funds in their FSAs at year-end to charity.
My proposal has several benefits over the stand-alone fixes
previously proposed. First, combining the two provisions is likely to
increase the incentive both to save for medical needs and to donate
to charity. Taxpayers will be more likely to participate and fully fund
their FSAs if they know unused amounts will go to charity instead of
being retained by their employers. Because amounts contributed to
4. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2009, at tbl.36 (Sept. 2009)
(describing the percentage of U.S. employees eligible to participate in health care FSAs);
MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH PLANS, ll. 619–20 (2008) (describing the health care FSA participation rates for
eligible employees).
5. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 22, 134 (1973).
6. See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the
Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2002).
7. The line in question is one that differentiates deductions that are used to determine
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and those that are not. Deductions used to determine AGI are
taken “above the line” and are available to all taxpayers. Below-the-line deductions may be
taken only by those who itemize their deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 63, 67, 68 (2006). For data
on the number of people who itemize, see I.R.S., SOI TAX STATS-INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 (COMPLETE REPORT) 32 tbl.1.2, 68 tbl.2.1 (2005), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inalcr.pdf. The 35% who itemize accounted for 80.5%
of all income tax revenue raised in 2005. See id.
8. See infra Part IV.
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FSAs are exempt from income, all taxpayers who donate to charity
through this mechanism will receive the equivalent of an above-theline deduction. Second, the proposal is likely to be both less
expensive and administratively easier than moving some or all of the
charitable deduction above the line. Finally, the proposal is likely to
garner more political support than earlier, stand-alone proposals, if
for no other reason than both charitable organizations and those
eligible for FSAs will join forces to support it.
Part II of this Article considers the different ways in which
Congress has used the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C., Tax Code or
Code) to encourage people to acquire insurance or otherwise
provide for medical needs. Part III examines the charitable
deduction. Part IV reviews prior efforts to remedy the perceived
flaws in both the charitable deduction and FSA provisions. Part V
contains the detailed proposal to allow taxpayers to donate unused
funds in an FSA at the end of the year to charity and evaluates the
proposal in light of concerns raised about prior attempts to reform
these provisions. While the IRS could adopt this proposal
administratively without changing the nature of FSAs, I argue that
Congress should instead take this opportunity to recast FSAs as taxfavored savings accounts and conform them to the way most people
think about and use them.
II. HEALTHCARE POLICY IN THE TAX CODE
The Tax Code contains a number of provisions allowing
taxpayers to deduct, exclude from income, or receive tax-free
insurance and reimbursement of amounts spent on medical care.
Some argue that these provisions are appropriate as a matter of
income measurement.9 However, most agree that provisions in the
Code related to healthcare spending are subsidies.10

9. For example, the Schanz-Haig-Simons income definition posits that income equals
consumption plus change in wealth over an accounting period. See HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL
POLICY 50 (1938). Most arguments regarding the propriety of deducting medical expenses
focus on the question of whether medical expenditures constitute consumption. See, e.g.,
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314
(1972) (arguing that medical expenditures should not be considered consumption and
therefore should be deductible). For an opposing view, see, for example, Mark G. Kelman,
Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an ‘Ideal’ Income Tax and Why They Fit
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979) (arguing that spending on
medical needs is a form of consumption). Thomas Griffith, who contends that the deductibility
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To understand FSAs, it helps to understand where they fit in the
panoply of tax provisions that affect healthcare. This Part considers
the structure and efficacy of these provisions, which can be broken
down into three main types. The first allows a deduction for medical
spending above a set floor. The second allows taxpayers to exclude
from income the value of employer-provided health insurance and
amounts received under such plans. The third allows taxpayers to
exclude from income amounts they save and then spend on medical
expenses. Despite the financial incentives these provisions provide,
most have failed to live up to their promise.

of a medical expense should depend on whether it increases overall societal welfare, notes that
Andrew’s argument is actually based on the impact of medical expenditures on a taxpayer’s
ability to pay taxes, as opposed to a definition of consumption. See Thomas D. Griffith,
Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 366–77 (1989).
If a deduction for medical expenses is warranted, a deduction for amounts paid for
health insurance or the exclusion of the value of health insurance received from one’s employer
is also warranted. Premiums for health insurance represent the expected value of medical
expenses over the coverage period. Allowing a deduction for such expenses or excluding the
receipt of insurance from income is tantamount to allowing a deduction when medical
expenses are incurred. See Jay A. Soled, Taxation of Employer-Provided Health Coverage:
Inclusion, Timing and Policy Issues, 15 VA. TAX REV. 447, 452–465 (1996) (arguing for the
exclusion from income of employer-provided health care on income-definition grounds).
10. The concept of the tax expenditure/subsidy was championed by Stanley Surrey, a
Harvard professor who served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy.
He also championed the idea of compiling an annual tax expenditure budget to track how
much money Congress spent indirectly by giving tax preferences to subsets of taxpayers. See
SURREY, supra note 5.
Tax expenditures have received significant criticism for complicating the Tax Code,
obscuring government spending, and distorting the budgeting process. See, e.g., Edward D.
Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and
Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). However, given the self-executing
nature of spending programs that run through the Tax Code, they may be more efficient than
direct spending programs. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 979–80 (2004). To the extent that they are designed
to redistribute income, they may be more efficient than stand-alone legal rules. See Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). In fact, the decision to integrate
spending into the Tax Code is more properly a question of institutional design. Weisbach &
Nussim, supra, at 957–61.
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A. Deductions for Medical Expenses
I.R.C. § 213 allows a deduction for certain medical expenses
above a floor. Congress added the predecessor to § 213 to the Tax
Code in 1942, when it converted the income tax into a mass tax to
help pay for World War II.11 The current version permits taxpayers
to deduct medical expenses that exceed 7.5% of their AGI.12 As part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Patient
Protection Act), this threshold will rise to 10% of AGI in 2013.13
Because this medical expense deduction falls below the line, it is
available only to those who itemize their deductions.14
The legislative history reveals that Congress did not see the
provision as necessary for income measurement; rather it viewed the
provision as a tool for affecting public policy.15 This is not to say that
the provision is a tax incentive. The point is not to provide financial
incentives for people to incur medical expenses. Rather, it provides
relief to those who suffer extraordinary injury by freeing up resources
to pay for medical care that might otherwise not be available.
Allowing a deduction for medical expenses is justified because it
supposedly enhances overall societal welfare.16
11. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619 § 127(a), 56 Stat. 825 (current version at I.R.C. §
213 (2006)).
12. See I.R.C. § 213 (2006). AGI is defined at I.R.C. § 62(a).
13. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
9013(a), 124 Stat. 119, 868 (2010). Taxpayers who turn 65 in 2013 through 2106 will be
able to use the 7.5% figure for those years. Id. § 9013(b).
14. See I.R.C. § 62 (2006). Medical expenses are not considered “miscellaneous
itemized deductions” and therefore are not subject to the 2% floor set forth in I.R.C. § 67.
Medical expenditures are also not limited by I.R.C. § 68, which reduces certain itemized
deductions for those whose income exceeds a floor.
15. During the hearings on the bill, a National Association of Retail Druggists
representative testified that an allowance for medical expenses was ostensibly included in the
personal exemption and that the proposal in the pending bill to significantly lower the
exemption would in effect subject medical expenses to tax for the first time. See Revenue Act of
1942: Hearing on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong. 1675–78 (statement
of Rowland Jones, Jr., Washington Rep. of the National Association of Retail Druggists). He
expressed fear that people would defer medical expenses in response to the increased tax
liability to their own detriment and that of the country generally. The Association thus argued
for full deductibility of all expenses. See id. at 1678. Others supported the Treasury
Department’s proposal that only extraordinary expenses be covered. See, e.g., id. at 2204
(statement submitted by Paul J. Kern, Committee on National Taxation, National Lawyer’s
Guild). In the end, Congress allowed taxpayers to deduct expenses above 5% of their AGI for
expenses paid for medical care, with a maximum deduction of $2500 for a head of family. See §
127(a), 56 Stat. at 825.
16. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 370.
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B. Employer Provided Health Insurance

By far the largest tax subsidy for healthcare can be found in
I.R.C. §§ 105, 106, 3101(a)–(b), and 3121(a)(2). These provisions
exclude from income and payroll taxes amounts employers pay to
insure their employees and amounts employees receive under health
and accident plans, whether in the form of direct payments to
doctors or reimbursement of employee-incurred expenses.17
However, these provisions were not originally intended as subsidies.
The issue of including employer-paid insurance premiums as income
first arose in 1919, when the IRS held that payments for individual
policies counted as income to the employee. However, the next year
the IRS ruled that premiums for group insurance were not income,
on the theory that such expenditures were for the benefit of the
employer and not the employee.18 At this point, only a small number
of Americans were subject to the income tax, so the ruling had little
practical effect.
Two things happened during World War II to thrust the
exemption for group insurance into the spotlight and make it
relevant to a large number of taxpayers. First, the income tax was
converted into a mass tax, which caused a large number of people to
become subject to it. Second, the National War Labor Board
decided to freeze wages. Given the shortage of workers, employers
sought creative ways to get around the wage controls. One option
was to offer health insurance.19 In 1943, the Labor Board held that
fringe benefits—including health insurance—would not be
considered salary for purposes of the wage freeze, thus giving a
significant boost to employer-provided health insurance.20 Congress
later codified the exclusion of health insurance from income as
I.R.C. § 106. As a result, the government now subsidizes the
purchase of health insurance, at least for those lucky enough to work
for employers who offer this benefit.

17. By one estimate, the government subsidy created by these provisions amounted to
$202 billion in 2004. It is routinely the largest tax expenditure in the Code. See Richard L.
Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of
American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 553–54 (2005).
18. For a discussion of this early history, see Soled, supra note 9, at 450.
19. See EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact; see
also T.D. 5295, 1943 C.B. 1193.
20. See EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 19.
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The provision of tax-free health insurance to employees involves
an implicit negotiation between employers and employees over the
form their compensation will take. While employees are not given
the express choice of receiving cash or an equivalent amount of
health insurance, in effect those who accept health insurance are
almost certainly taking home less salary than they otherwise would.
Normally, those who choose between cash and some other benefit
are deemed to be in constructive receipt of cash, and therefore must
include the value of the benefit in income.21 However, perhaps
because employees are not making an express tradeoff, they are not
deemed in constructive receipt of any income by virtue of receiving
health insurance.
The efficacy of the benefit provided by I.R.C. § 106 is limited.
Not only is the benefit available to a limited number of taxpayers,22
but costs for health insurance have also risen dramatically. By one
recent estimate, approximately 50 million people in the U.S. are
without health insurance.23 Those who have employer-sponsored
insurance are being asked to shoulder more and more of the costs of
health insurance directly.24 The Patient Protection Act addresses
some of these problems by mandating that people obtain health
insurance and by providing subsidies to those who cannot afford to
do so. However, the Act still relies heavily on employer-sponsored
insurance and the associated tax incentives as the primary tool for
expanding coverage.25 If Republicans succeed in repealing the law or
otherwise blocking its implementation, as they have threatened, the
existing problems are likely to persist.

21. See Soled, supra note 9, at 479–80.
22. While virtually all full-time state and local government workers were offered
retirement and medical benefits, in the private sector only 69% of workers were offered medical
benefits. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States–
March 2011 (July 26, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnr0017.txt. Only 22% of
private sector workers had access to medical care benefits amongst the lowest 10% of wage
earners. Id.
23. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FIVE FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED
(2010), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7806-03.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Noam N. Levey, Workers Bearing Brunt of Higher Health-Care Costs, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 3, 2010, at A5.
25. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1501(a)(2)(D), 124 Stat. 119, 242 (finding that near-universal coverage will be achieved “by
building upon and strengthening the private employer-based health insurance system”).
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C. Cafeteria Plans and FSAs

In 1978, Congress added I.R.C. § 125 to the Code, creating
“cafeteria plans.” These plans allow taxpayers to make explicit
choices between receiving cash or qualified tax-favored benefits
without running afoul of the constructive receipt rules.26 A key
feature of qualifying benefits is that, with a few important exceptions,
they may not involve deferred compensation.27 Section 125 opened
the door for FSAs, which allow employees to elect to set aside part of
their salary and use it to pay their medical expenses.28 Money
contributed is exempt from both income and payroll taxes.29
However, any amount not used at the end of the year is forfeited to
the employer.30 Until recently, the law imposed no limits on the
amount that could be contributed to an FSA, though employers
often set a $5000 limit.31 As part of the Patient Protection Act,
Congress has limited the amount that can be contributed to $2500
starting in 2013.32 In addition, starting in 2011, over-the-counter

26. See I.R.C. § 125(a) (2006).
27. See id. § 125(d)(2)(A).
28. The current rules are contained in Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.125-5, 72
Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,957 (Aug. 6, 2007). Some health care FSAs involve only employer
contributions. Such plans are not covered under I.R.C. § 125. Instead they are viewed as a
form of employer-provided insurance under I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106. I focus here only on
health care FSAs that are part of a cafeteria plan.
29. See I.R.C. §§ 105, 3121(a).
30. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,942 (discussing the “Use-orLose Rule” as satisfying cafeteria plan requirement of I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(A) prohibiting
deferral of compensation).
31. FSAs also exist for dependent care. Under such plans, taxpayers may put away
money to be used to pay for dependent care on a tax-free basis. Many of the same issues that
exist for health care FSAs exist for dependent care FSAs. I do not focus on these accounts in
this Article, but many of the same arguments could be made. Section 129 of the Code imposes
a $5,000 limit for dependent care FSAs, and it appears that many plans similarly limit
contributions to health care FSAs. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2 Q&A (7)(f) ex. 2
(1989); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,942. According to a 2007 study
by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit plans, 54% of its members capped
contributions at some amount up to $4,999, and 42% capped contributions at $5000 or more.
Unfortunately, the report does not indicate how many of that 42% capped contributions at
exactly $5000. See INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, FLEXIBLE BENEFIT PLANS AND
FSAS 5 (2007). The Federal FSA plan limits contributions to $5000. See JANEMARIE MULVEY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32656, HEALTH CARE FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS 6
(2010).
32. See I.R.C. § 125(i) (2006), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1403(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1063.
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drugs will no longer be eligible for reimbursement from such
accounts.33
To most employees, FSAs look and function like tax-favored
savings accounts. Employees contribute their own money and then
recover it by submitting receipts documenting their health care
expenditures. However, to the IRS, FSAs are a form of employerprovided health insurance. The characterization of FSAs as insurance
has led to many of the rules that make FSAs difficult to use,
contributing to the low participation rates discussed more fully
below. To understand why the FSA rules are so restrictive, it helps to
trace their history.
With the introduction of cafeteria plans in 1978, employees were
permitted for the first time to direct their salary dollars towards the
purchase of health insurance, including plans that would reimburse
them directly for their medical expenses. Some early plans
overreached, allowing employees to submit medical expenses to their
employers, who then characterized an equal amount of the
employees’ normal salary as a reimbursement and therefore arguably
exempt from tax.34 In early 1984, the IRS announced that any
amounts received under such plans did not qualify for tax exclusion
under I.R.C. § 125.35
Later that year, the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations setting forth the first guidance on what was necessary for
an FSA to qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 125.36 The
regulations stated that any benefit that allowed participants to carry
unused amounts over from one year to the next could not be offered
in a cafeteria plan because carryover would amount to deferred
compensation in violation of I.R.C. § 125(d)(2).37 Without stating a
basis for the ruling, the regulations further required that in cafeteria
plans employees must elect benefits before the benefits become
available38 (i.e., before the tax year begins) and prohibited employees

33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 854 (2010).
34. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-24, 1984-10 I.R.B. 39 (Mar. 5, 1984); I.R.S. News
Release IR-84-22 (Feb 10, 1984).
35. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-24, 1984-10 I.R.B. 39; I.R.S. News Release IR-84-22.
36. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,322, 19,322–29 (May 7, 1984).
37. See id. at 19,324, Q&A 7.
38. See id. at 19,325, Q&A 15.
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from revoking their elections, even as to future contributions, absent
a change in family status.39
In 1989, the Treasury Department issued another set of
proposed regulations, further clarifying the rules governing FSAs.40
These rules attempted to distinguish between medical expenses
deductible under I.R.C. § 213 and amounts received tax-free under
an FSA. In particular, the Treasury was concerned that FSAs were
being used to allow employees to deduct their first dollar of medical
expenses in contravention of the policy implicit in I.R.C. § 213,
which had a floor of 7.5% of AGI. The regulations made clear that to
qualify as a tax-free benefit FSAs had to function like insurance
contracts described in I.R.C. § 106. To this end, the employer must
bear a meaningful risk of loss, thus creating an incentive to guard
against adverse selection by employees and inappropriate
reimbursement of employee expenses.41
The regulations cast employee contributions as “premiums” and
describe reimbursements as recovery on a claim, not simply receiving
back one’s own money. For most plans, the coverage purchased is
equal to the amount of premiums paid, though employers can create
plans where amounts paid out exceed the premiums paid by up to
500%.42 While few would ever consider buying an insurance policy
where the benefits equal the premiums paid, the tax savings
associated with FSAs make them economically attractive to
43
employees.
Consistent with traditional insurance policies, employees need
not wait until they have contributed the full amount (paid their
premiums in full) before seeking reimbursement (making a claim).44
39. See id. at 19,324, Q&A 8. In 2000, the Treasury Department issued final
regulations addressing what constituted a change in status that would allow FSA participants to
change their elections. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.125-4, 66 Fed. Reg. 1837, 1840 (Jan. 10,
2001).
40. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. 9468 (March 7, 1989).
41. Cf. id. at 9482, Q&A 7(a).
42. See id. at 9483, Q&A 7(f).
43. A simple numeric example illustrates why the tax savings associated with FSAs make
them economically attractive to employees. If a taxpayer earns $100, contributes it to an FSA,
and incurs medical costs of $80, the taxpayer loses $20 at the end of the year. However, he
only needs to earn $100 to cover $80 of healthcare. If the taxpayer decides not to contribute
to an FSA to avoid the risk of forfeiture, he must earn $133.33 to pay for $80 of medical care,
assuming a tax rate of 40%. As a result, he is better off participating in the FSA even though he
forfeits money.
44. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. at 9482, Q&A 7(f) (stating that
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Thus, an employee who elects to contribute $5,000 and incurs a
large medical expense in January can get full reimbursement
immediately even though it will take a full year for her employer to
withhold the entire amount elected. It is this feature that creates the
risk for the employer and makes the plan look like insurance in the
eyes of the IRS. If the employee were to leave her employment in
February, no mechanism exists for the employer to claw back
amounts reimbursed in excess of her contributions.
Payments must be for expenses incurred during the coverage
period, which must last the entire year to prevent employees from
seeking coverage only during times of the year when they know they
will have expenses.45 Only qualified medical expenses described in
I.R.C. § 213 are reimbursable.46 Although the IRS significantly
broadened covered expenditures in 2003 by ruling that
reimbursement of amounts paid to purchase nonprescription drugs
were permissible within an FSA,47 the Patient Protection Act
rescinded this rule starting in 2011.48 Thus, only medical services,
devices, and prescription drugs will be covered, making FSAs less
attractive to many users. Finally, to be reimbursed, employees must
submit a written statement from an independent third party (i.e., a
receipt) describing the nature and amount of the expense.49
The 1984 regulations made clear that participants forfeited any
unused amounts. The 1989 regulations set forth the appropriate use
of such funds, which are described as “experience gains.”50 Such
amounts may be used to reduce premiums in future years, or they
may be returned to the FSA participants as dividends or premium
refunds. However, any amounts returned in this manner cannot be
based on the actual experience of any given participant. Thus,
someone who has $100 left in his account cannot expect to receive a
$100 reduction in future premiums or a $100 premium refund.
Instead, the total amount left over in the fund must be allocated
among all participants based on some neutral principle.

reimbursements must be available at all times during the period of coverage).
45. See id. at 9482–83, Q&A 7(3).
46. See id. at 9483, Q&A 7(4).
47. See Rev. Rul. 03-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559.
48. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 854 (2010).
49. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, 54 Fed. Reg. at 9467.
50. See id.

1052

DO NOT DELETE

1041

10/15/2011 1:30 PM

Charitable FSAs

In 2007, the Treasury Department issued another set of
proposed regulations to replace those issued in 1984 and 1989.51
The new proposed § 1.125-5 is devoted solely to FSAs and
continues much of what came before. It reaffirms the use-it-or-loseit feature but allows employers to give employees a two-and-a-half
month grace period after the end of the year to spend unused funds
on the theory that such a short grace period does not run afoul of
the bar on deferred compensation.52 It also continues the
requirement that FSAs have insurance-like characteristics, making
clear that reimbursements must conform to the rules of § 105. The
regulation further clarifies that employers may retain unused
premiums, use them to defray administrative costs, lessen future
premiums, or refund the premiums to employees, so long as they do
so on a uniform and reasonable basis.53
The rules described above make sense if one wants to make FSAs
look like insurance policies; they make little sense if one wants
employees to make full use of FSAs. They depress participation
because eligible taxpayers either decide not to participate or
underfund their accounts to avoid the risk of forfeiture. They also
engender significant frustration among eligible taxpayers and create
incentives for participants to incur unnecessary medical expenses.54
The people for whom FSAs work the best are those with predictable,
periodic medical expenses, such as prescription drugs not covered by
insurance, or orthodontia. For those with less predictable medical
expenses, the forfeiture rule, when combined with the requirement
that employees make an irrevocable election on how much to set
aside before the year begins, creates a significant risk that employees
will lose some of the money they set aside.55

51. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938-4001 (Aug. 6, 2007).
52. The IRS had announced this policy in 2005. See I.R.S. Notice 05-42, 2005-232
I.R.B. 1204. Not all employers have opted to amend their plans to allow this.
53. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,943.
54. See Daniel Kadlec, Inflexible-Spending Accounts, TIME, Oct. 21, 2002, at 86,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003493-1,00.html
(describing the purchase of new eyeglass frames and other medical services at the end of the
year to avoid forfeiting amounts remaining in FSAs).
55. While it is possible that participants could get some money back in the form of
reduced future contributions or premium refunds, few health care FSAs appear to return
money to FSA participants in one of these two ways. I have heard anecdotally that the
University of Minnesota’s FSA plan made unused amounts available to other participants. I do
not have any concrete evidence of how widespread this practice is.
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According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics National
Compensation Survey, as of 2009 only 39% of all workers were
eligible to enroll in FSAs.56 As of 2002 only about 12% of those
eligible to enroll in such plans do so.57 Nonetheless, the trend has
been an increase in participation: a 2008 Mercer Survey revealed that
21% of those eligible participated in 2007, while 22% participated in
2008.58 In 2008, the average contribution for those who did
participate was $1,380.59 Unfortunately, no data is available on the
relationship this number bears to the average actual medical
expenses. Thus, there is no way to know the extent to which people
underfund FSAs to avoid a possible forfeiture penalty.
Data regarding the number of people who forfeit money
suggests that most people spend all the money in their accounts.
According to an International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans
survey from 2006, 62% of the respondent employers reported that
less than 7% of FSA participants forfeited any money. Another 6% of
respondent employers reported that between 20% and 29% of
participants forfeited money, while a full 30% of these employers did
not have information on forfeitures.60 When people do forfeit funds,
the data suggests that they forfeit very small amounts. The
International Foundation survey reveals that 51% of respondents
reported average forfeiture amounts under $300, and only 6%
reported higher average amounts. Again, 30% of respondents did not
have data on forfeitures.61

56. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY (Sept.
2009). The survey includes “civilian” workers, which excludes federal employees, who do have
access to such plans. Among those who had the ability to participate, the numbers were skewed
heavily towards those in higher tax brackets. Id. In addition, this benefit was skewed towards
companies with more than 100 employees, with approximately 83% of all such companies
offering FSAs, comprising 51% of all workers. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, 2009
NATIONAL
SURVEY
OF
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH
PLANS
(2009),
http://www.mercer.com/survey-reports/2009-US-national-health-plan-survey
(purchase
required); see also INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 3 (indicating that
73% of employers reported a participation rate at or below 39%; 20% reported a higher rate,
and 7% did not know their participation rates).
57. See Kadlec, supra note 54, at 86.
58. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, supra note 56.
59. See id.; see also INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 5
(showing that 74% reported contributions under $3000, 2.4% reported higher contributions,
and 24% did not have data on this question).
60. See INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 6.
61. See id.
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It is not clear whether these forfeiture rates and amounts reflect
that people are good at estimating their annual medical expenses,
underfund their accounts to avoid the risk of forfeiture, or race out
to spend money at the end of the year to avoid forfeiture. Nor is
there any data on the amount of time spent trying to calculate
anticipated medical expenses so as not to overfund FSAs. It is almost
impossible to obtain this information. However, if the conversations
in which I have participated while writing this article are indicative,
people spend significant time trying to estimate their medical
expenses. Moreover, intentional underfunding and last-minute
spending sprees are the principal causes of the relatively low
forfeiture rates and amounts.
D. Tax-Favored Health Savings Accounts
While FSAs appear to most users to be tax-favored savings
accounts, Congress has created actual tax-favored savings accounts as
part of its plan to encourage taxpayers to sign up for high deductible
health insurance plans. Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs), later
renamed Archer MSAs, were created in 1996 on an experimental
basis to rein in the rapid growth in health care costs.62 The notion
was that high-deductible plans would be less expensive than
traditional health insurance, thus prompting more people to acquire
insurance. Moreover, consumers would be more cost conscious if
they had to pay for medical costs out of pocket, at least until their
deductibles were reached. To encourage taxpayers to elect such
plans, Congress allowed taxpayers to receive an above-the-line
deduction for amounts contributed to Archer MSAs.63 If such plans
were part of a cafeteria plan, contributed amounts were also
exempted from payroll taxes.64 Amounts in an Archer MSA could be
spent on qualifying medical expenses without the taxpayer incurring
any tax liability.65 Any unused amounts were rolled over to the next
62. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at I.R.C. § 220 (2006)). For the provision renaming the
accounts, see Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 202 app.
G, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-628 to -629 (2000).
63. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(16), 220 (2006). For participants on Medicare, direct
contributions by Health and Human Services were also excluded from a taxpayer’s income. See
id. § 138.
64. See EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, I.R.S. Pub. 15-B, at 15 (May
24, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf.
65. See I.R.C. § 220(d)(2), (f). Amounts not spent on such expenses were subject to tax
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year. Unlike FSAs, taxpayers could invest funds contributed to an
Archer MSA as they wished, and any returns on such investment
were also exempt from tax.66
As noted, Archer MSAs were experimental. As a result, they had
a number of features that hampered their acceptance. They had a
definite end date,67 only a limited number of accounts could be
created,68 and only self-employed individuals or those who worked
for companies with fewer than fifty employees were allowed to create
them.69 In 2001, only about 80,000 accounts were set up, far below
the 750,000 limit Congress established.70
In 2003, Congress created a permanent version of Archer MSAs,
called Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).71 Like MSAs, these accounts
may only be used in conjunction with high-deductible insurance
policies.72 Both employers and employees may contribute to HSAs,
although annual contributions are limited. For 2011, the limits are
$3,050 for an individual and $6,150 for a family, though people
over fifty-five years old may contribute an extra $1,000.73 Those who
participate in an FSA are not eligible to contribute to an HSA.74

and a penalty. See id. § 220(f)(1)–(2), (4).
66. See I.R.C. § 220(e).
67. The end date was extended twice, for a total of three years. See Community Renewal
Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 201(a) app. G, 114 Stat. 2763A-587 to -628
(providing for a two-year extension of availability for medical savings accounts); Job Creation
and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 612(a), 116 Stat. 21, 61 (2002)
(providing for a one-year extension).
68. See I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A)(ii).
69. See id. §§ 220(c)(1)(A)(iii)(I)–(II), 401(c)(1)(B).
70. See I.R.S. Announcement 02-90, 2002-2 C.B. 684 (explaining that there were
78,913 MSAs created in 2001).
71. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (primarily amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000)). The
Act added § 223 to the Code.
72. High deductible insurance is defined as insurance with a deductible of at least $1200
for individuals and $2400 for families, where the combined cost of the insurance and the
deductible does not exceed $5950 for individuals and $11,900 for families. See I.R.C. §
223(c)(2), (g); EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note 64, at 15.
Unlike MSAs, these accounts permit contributions from both employees and
employers in the same year. See HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED
HEALTH PLANS, I.R.S. Pub. 969 (Jan 14, 2011), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p969.pdf.
73. See I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)–(3), (g). EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS,
supra note 64, at 15; HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH
PLANS, supra note 72, at 5.
74. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(1); EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note
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Contributions are deducted above the line75 and are also exempt
from payroll taxes if the HSA is part of a cafeteria plan.76 Income
earned within HSAs is also tax exempt.77
HSAs are explicitly excluded from the deferred compensation
limitations found in I.R.C. § 125,78 and unused funds at year-end are
rolled over to the next year.79 If amounts contributed to an HSA are
spent for non-eligible expenses, those amounts must be included in
income and are subjected to a 20% penalty tax.80 When an HSA
owner dies, the HSA continues if his spouse is the beneficiary.81 If
another person acquires the account, the money must be distributed
and included in income. However, the 20% penalty is not assessed.82
The penalty is also not assessed after an HSA owner reaches 65,
regardless of what he spends the money on.83 Thus, HSAs provide a
tax-deferred savings vehicle, similar to a traditional Individual
Retirement Account or 401(k) plan, for taxpayers lucky enough to
reach retirement or who die without needing the money contributed
to an HSA.84
The hope was that making MSA-type accounts permanent would
spur the market for high deductible plans, further increasing the
incentive for individual taxpayers to save for their medical needs
while acting to slow the growth of medical costs. However, to date,
the use of HSAs within plans remains below expectations. According
to one study, in 2005 only 2% of employers offered such plans.85
While the percentage jumped to 6% in 2006, even this number is
substantially below target.86 To the extent that the goal was to
64, at 15.
75. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 223(a).
76. See EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS, supra note 64, at 15.
77. See I.R.C. § 223(e).
78. See id. § 125(d)(2)(D) (2006).
79. See id. § 223(d)(1)(E).
80. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(2)–(4) (West 2010). Prior to 2010, the tax penalty was 10%. See
I.R.C. § 223(f)(4).
81. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(8)(A).
82. See id. § 223(f)(4)(B), (8)(B).
83. See id. § 223(f)(4)(C); Social Security Act § 1811, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006).
84. This problem could readily be solved by requiring that unused amounts in HSAs be
donated to charity upon the death of the beneficial owner.
85. See CATHERINE HOFFMAN & JENNIFER TOLBERT, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
AND HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: ARE THEY AN OPTION FOR LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES? 7 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7568.pdf.
86. See id.
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encourage low-income uninsured people to obtain insurance, the
plan has also been a disappointment; users tend to be higher-income
individuals.87 In addition, one study of the program from 2005 to
2007 showed that between 42% and 49% of people who had a high
deductible plan failed to open an HSA, suggesting that the tax
incentive is unnecessary for those participants or that they simply do
not have funds available to contribute.88
In addition, while high-deductible medical insurance plans may
make economic sense for the healthy, the chronically ill will almost
certainly spend through their deductible each year, eating up any
possible savings that might be associated with such plans.89
Accordingly, the plans are far more attractive to some than others,
skewing the risk pools.90 Finally, the institutions that offer HSAs
often charge significant annual fees that can eat up a portion of the
amounts set aside. Set-up charges can be as high as $20, with
monthly fees of up to $3, for an annual total of $36.91 It would be
an understatement to say that this approach to health care cost
management is controversial.92
E. Analysis of Health Care Provisions
The patchwork of tax provisions described above is both
incoherent and ineffective. The I.R.C. § 213 deduction sets a floor
below which medical spending is not deductible, presumably based
upon the theory that no deduction is warranted unless taxpayers
incur extraordinary expenses. Yet, the exclusion from income of
employer-provided healthcare is the functional equivalent of allowing
taxpayers to deduct the first dollar of medical expenses, at least if
87. See HSA Participation Up, Mostly Among Higher-Income Earners, 2008 TAX NOTES
TODAY 95–5 (May 15, 2008).
88. See id.
89. HOFFMAN & TOLBERT, supra note 85, at 4.
90. See id. at 6.
91. See Michelle Andrews, The Promise and the Pitfalls of Health Savings Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at B6; see also I.R.S. Notice 08–59, 2008–29 I.R.B. 123 (describing
how fees are to be accounted for).
92. See, e.g., Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and Consumer Driven Health Care: Cost
Containment or Cost Shift?: Hearing on H.R. 5917 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 94–95 (2008) (written Statement of Gail Shearer,
Director, Health Policy Analysis, Washington Office, Consumers Union), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg50037/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg50037.pdf;
id. at 32–38 (statement of Linda J. Blumberg, Ph.D., Principal Research Associate, The Urban
Institute).
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taxpayers do not incur any uninsured expenses. Similarly, the
exclusion of FSA and HSA contributions provides the functional
equivalent of a deduction for the first dollar spent on healthcare,
thus overriding I.R.C. § 213’s policy of disallowing deductions
below a floor.
Despite the subsidies for employer-provided insurance, the
number of uninsured people in the United States stands at
93
approximately fifty million. Both FSAs and HSAs have failed to live
up to their promise, as a surprisingly low number of those eligible to
participate actually do. Moreover, these provisions may work at
cross-purposes. A subsidy for health insurance makes buying
insurance more attractive because it lowers the cost. However, the
ability to exclude amounts contributed to FSAs and HSAs from
income lowers the cost of being uninsured, reducing the incentive to
acquire insurance. If health care policy is conceived of as a jet plane
and these provisions its engines, it appears that Congress has pointed
the engines in different directions.94
The recent effort at federal health care reform and the current
effort to undo it reveal that it is extremely difficult in the current
environment to address all of these issues on a global basis.
Accordingly, I focus here on one piece of the puzzle—the FSA.
While this provision is far smaller in dollar terms than the exclusion
for traditional health insurance, it causes significant taxpayer
aggravation, which cannot help but affect the way in which taxpayers
view the income tax as a whole. However, before considering how
best to improve FSAs, I turn first to discuss the charitable deduction,
another tax expenditure that many see as underperforming.
III. THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
The Code has allowed a deduction for charitable donations since
1917.95 Nonetheless, the rationale for the deduction is not entirely

93. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 23.
94. See Kleinbard, supra note 10, at 17 n.61 (noting that Congress, unlike aerospace
engineers, cannot always be trusted to point the engines in the same direction).
95. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330. An effort to
have a similar provision included in the original 1913 Act was unsuccessful. See J.S. SEIDMAN,
SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938–1861, at 945
(1938). For a discussion of the history of the charitable donation, see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches,
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001).
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clear.96 The legislative history suggests that a key reason for enacting
it was a fear that wealthy individuals would not otherwise donate to
institutions of higher education, which had come to depend on
donations for their survival.97 However, the charitable deduction was
not limited to this ostensible purpose; deductions were allowed for
donations to all types of charitable organizations. The Code
provisions related to charitable deductions have been amended
numerous times over the past ninety years, further clouding the
98
legislative history.
Scholars have offered two basic justifications for a broad
charitable deduction. As with the health care provisions, some argue
that the charitable deduction is appropriate on income definition
grounds because amounts given to charity do not constitute income
in a theoretical sense and therefore should be excluded from the tax
base.99 Others argue that charity should be subsidized, and that the
deduction serves as an indirect subsidy to charity because it
encourages people to donate. As the subsidy theory predominates, I
focus on that here.
Justifications for a subsidy for charity are many, but they
generally fall into two categories. The first is that “subsidizing
charities is necessary to assist them in providing public goods that
would otherwise be under-produced due to market and

96. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531,
547 (2006) (describing the theories of the charitable deduction as “underdetermined” and
“undertheorized”).
97. See 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917).
98. See generally Aprill, supra note 95.
99. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 9, at 313; see also, Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffery H.
Kahn, “Gifts Gafts and Geft”—The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and
Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 461 (2003). For a contrary view see Kelman, supra note 9, at
849; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation
of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1992) (arguing that charitable giving contains an
element of personal consumption).
For additional theories of why a deduction should be allowed for charitable giving,
see Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L.
REV. 37, 58–59 (1972) (arguing for a deduction for charitable giving because such giving
reduces a taxpayer’s well-being or ability to pay, for which income is really a proxy); Alvin
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1088
(1980) (arguing that the sum of individual incomes should equal societal income and
concluding that charitable giving does not increase societal income, thus warranting a
deduction so long as the recipient includes the gift in income).
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governmental failures.”100 The second is that subsidizing charitable
giving reinforces democratic and other values,101 or otherwise
increases general welfare.102 Regardless of the justification offered,
the underlying contention of these different theories is that society
gains more from the subsidy, whether economically or in other
intangible ways, than it costs to provide the subsidy.
Accepting, arguendo, that the government should subsidize
charity, the question that arises is how best to do it. Options range
from direct subsidies, where the government issues grants to
charitable organizations, to indirect subsidies, where the government
creates incentives for others to do so. If the justification for
government support of private charity rests on the notion that
government is incapable of producing the appropriate mix or level of
public goods, direct subsidies controlled by the government make
little sense because the government is likely to repeat its mistakes in
making direct grants to charitable organizations.103 Instead, it makes
100. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93
MINN. L. REV. 165, 183 (2008). Theorists have articulated several reasons why government
would subsidize nongovernmental actors in its quest to provide public goods rather than
provide those goods itself. Where demand is heterogeneous, it will be almost impossible for
the government to determine the precise mix and level of goods that will maximize welfare.
Charities are likely to be far more efficient than the government, and they can serve as
laboratories for ideas, much as the states purportedly do in our federal system. In addition,
government may not be able to provide the goods because of constitutional or other limits.
For an in-depth discussion of these reasons, see Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988).
101. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond
Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1 (2006)
(arguing that private charity promotes diversity); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 387, 405–06 (1998) (noting that tax subsidies for charities may help a portion of citizens
become more involved individually with charities than they would without a tax subsidy). But
see Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for
the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 390–91 (1972) (noting that even though the
author is generally supportive of subsidized charity, the pluralistic benefits from the subsidy
may be overstated).
102. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 508 & n.7 (2010) (arguing that charity
enhances welfare through wealth redistribution); Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the
Charitable Deduction to Legislate Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and
Individual Humanity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 304–
306 (2010) (citing evidence that charitable giving is beneficial for both the donor and
recipient).
103. One way to retain a direct subsidy while discerning and honoring taxpayer
preferences would be through direct matching grants to charities. At the end of each year,
charities could provide lists of donors and amounts received. The government could then issue
grants to those charities proportional to donations received. For a debate on this approach,
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far more sense to allow individuals to choose where their public
good dollars are spent. This is where the Code comes in.
The Code provides two possible methods for providing indirect
subsidies to taxpayers. The first method is to allow taxpayers to
exclude or deduct amounts donated to charity.104 The second
method is to award tax credits to taxpayers for the same activity.
Under a deduction model, a taxpayer who gives away income
deducts the same amount, thus lowering his income and reducing his
tax liability by his marginal rate.105 The subsidy rate implicit in this
approach is equal to the taxpayer’s marginal rate. As a result, those in
higher tax brackets receive a higher subsidy than those in lower tax
brackets.106 Moreover, setting the subsidy at the taxpayer’s marginal
rate yields a result equivalent to what would happen if the taxpayer
had never earned the amounts given away and possibly reflects
ambivalence as to the deduction’s proper justification.
Under a credit approach, taxpayers determine their income and
tax liability without regard to their donations. Instead, they receive a
tax credit for their donation that directly reduces the amount of tax
owed.107 Unlike the deduction approach, it is necessary to set the
amount of the subsidy explicitly. Moreover, absent express provisions
that phase the subsidy in or out depending on income levels, all
taxpayers receive the same amount of subsidy, thus avoiding the
upside down subsidy problem implicit in a deduction approach.
While Congress has increased its use of tax credits in recent years, the
compare McDaniel, supra note 101 (advocating the use of a matching grant program instead
of the current subsidy regime), with Bittker, supra note 99 (explaining why matching grant
programs could not pass constitutional or practical concerns and are therefore unworkable).
While this approach is used in England, it has never been seriously considered in U.S. political
circles. For a discussion of how the English system, called Gift Aid, works, see Gift Aid—
Information
for
Charities,
DIRECTGOV,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/
MoneyTaxAndBenefits/ManagingMoney/GivingMoneyToCharity/DG_10015097
(last
visited Sept. 14, 2011).
104. While some have called for allowing a deduction or credit for donated time, see
Thomas, supra note 102, at 271, Congress to date has refrained from so doing. Accordingly, I
will focus here only on donations of money or property.
105. From an income tax perspective, this approach yields a result consistent with
excluding amounts donated to charity from income. However, this does not take payroll taxes
into account. Amounts excluded from income are also exempt from payroll taxes. Amounts
deducted from income remain subject to the payroll tax. As discussed more fully below, this
can be a significant difference.
106. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 5, at 134–38.
107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2011) (allowing a dollar-for-dollar
credit for contributions to school tuition organizations).
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deduction remains the primary means of handling charitable
donations in the federal tax system.
However, Congress has imposed a number of limits on the
ability to deduct charitable donations that significantly affect the
incentive to give. For instance, taxpayers may deduct the entire
amount of any cash donations. In contrast, Congress has limited the
deduction for most property donations to a taxpayer’s basis in the
property donated,108 yielding a result equivalent to what would occur
if the income had never been earned.
Congress has also limited the total amount that may be deducted
in any given year.109 Under current law, taxpayers may deduct
charitable donations up to a maximum of fifty percent of income,110
though Congress has made a number of exceptions to this rule to
encourage giving.111 Taxpayers are allowed to carry over excess
amounts into subsequent tax years for five years, so, except for those

108. See I.R.C. § 170(e) (2006). Congress has created several exceptions to this rule. For
instance, where the use of the donation by the recipient is related to the basis for the
recipient’s tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501, a donor may deduct the full fair market value.
See id. at § 170(e)(1). Allowing some taxpayers to deduct the full fair market value of
appreciated property raises equity concerns, see, e.g., Halperin, supra note 6, at 1–4, and allows
taxpayers to deduct amounts never included in income, a clear violation of tax logic. However,
if the goal is to provide a subsidy, there is simply no reason why the level of the subsidy should
be so limited. Instead, the question should be whether the subsidy level is justified by the net
benefit to society.
109. Limits may serve many purposes. They may blunt the upside down nature of the
subsidy and help preserve the progressivity found in the Code; to the extent that the wealthy
donate to different charities than the poor, they could affect the mix of charities receiving
donations; and they could also act as a crude Alternative Minimum Tax, ensuring that all
taxpayers pay something even when availing themselves of legitimate tax preferences. See
Fleischer, supra note 100, at 192–93, 196, 202. We could also conceive of the decision to
allow a deduction as a compromise between the majority voters who set the government’s
agenda (the classic majority) and a second majority (the new majority), comprised of minority
groups who have different preferences but cannot coalesce around one that outstrips the classic
majority. Limits allow the new majority to direct the use of some, but not all, of their tax
money. See id. at 207–10.
110. I.R.C. § 170(b). The Code actually refers to “contribution base,” which is a
modified version of AGI. This limit has changed numerous times over the past ninety years,
always trending ever higher from the original fifteen percent of “net taxable income.” For a
brief history of how the limits have changed, see Fleischer, supra note 100, at 170–73.
111. If the donor of a conservation easement is a qualified farmer or rancher, the
maximum amount of the donation rises from 50% to 100% of income. I.R.C. § 170(b)(E).
Some provisions are temporary. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, Congress lifted the
limits on charitable contributions in cash made between August 28, 2005 and December 31,
2005. See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016,
2022–23 (2005).
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who have little income, this provision mostly affects timing.112
Congress has also tinkered with the limit by allowing some taxpayers
to exclude certain amounts donated from income.113
Congress has also experimented with the subsidy by changing
the timing for charitable deductions. Normally, deductions are taken
in the tax year in which donations are made.114 However, in response
to natural disasters, in some years Congress has allowed donors to
take deductions against a previous year’s income.115
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress has significantly
limited the charitable deduction’s incentive effect by placing it below
the line, where it is not considered when calculating AGI. AGI is a
preliminary measure of net income used to determine which
taxpayers are eligible for certain provisions. Initially, above-the-line
deductions differed in type from those that fell below the line, with
below-the-line deductions more likely to be tax preferences or other

112. There is no way to know what effect the limit has on donation decisions, but
statistics from 2008 reveal that approximately 440,000 returns claimed a carryover amount. See
STATISTICS OF INCOME—2008 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, I.R.S. Pub. 1304 (July
2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08inalcr.pdf. It is not possible to know
how many people refrained from donating because of the limits.
113. For instance, those who win certain types of prizes, such as the Nobel Prize, may
exclude them from income so long as they donate their winnings to a charitable organization.
See I.R.C. § 74(b). Similarly, a recent provision permits those ages 70 ½ and older who donate
their IRAs to charity to exclude up to $100,000 of the donated amounts from income. See id.
at § 408(d)(8). Originally set to expire on December 31, 2007, this provision was extended to
December 31, 2009 by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, §205(a), 122 Stat. 3765, 3865 (2008); see also I.R.S. Notice 07-7,
2007-1 C.B. 395.
114. See I.R.C. § 170(a). Different rules apply to accrual method corporations. However,
the bulk of American charity is from individuals. See Press Release, Giving USA Foundation,
U.S. Charitable Giving Falls 3.6% in 2009 to $303.75 Billion (June 9, 2010), available at
http://www.givingusa.org/press_releases/gusa/gusa060910.pdf (reporting that individuals
gave $227.41 billion to charities in 2009).
115. In response to the massive earthquake that occurred in the Andaman Sea on
December 26, 2004, causing a massive tsunami that wiped out entire villages and killed an
estimated 230,000 people, Congress allowed people to deduct in the 2004 tax year donations
made through January 31 of 2005. See Act of Jan. 7, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-1, 119 Stat. 3.
More recently, in response to the massive earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010,
killing approximately 220,000, Congress allowed cash donations to benefit the Haiti
earthquake survivors to be deducted against 2009 income, so long as they were made between
January 12, 2010 and March 1, 2010. See Act of Jan. 22, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-126, 124
Stat. 3; see also I.R.S. Notice 1396 (Jan. 2010), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/n1396.pdf.
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expenditures that were not considered essential when calculating
relative incomes. This distinction has broken down over time.116
However, with the introduction of the standard deduction in
1944, placement above or below the line took on additional
significance. Those who took the standard deduction were not
allowed to take below-the-line deductions as well,117 thus blunting
any incentives associated with the now displaced deductions. Several
members of Congress argued for moving the charitable deduction
above the line to keep the incentives for giving in place.118
Ultimately, they were outvoted by those who believed that those in
the lower income brackets would give regardless of the tax incentive,
that simplification gains were worth the loss of the incentive, or that
no separate deduction was needed because the standard deduction
was set at a level that included presumed charitable donations.119
Finally, as part of the 1986 reforms, Congress added I.R.C. § 68
to the Code, which limits the amount of itemized deductions
taxpayers whose AGI exceeds a certain threshold may take.120 As a
result, even those who itemize may not get the full benefit of their
charitable deductions, regardless of whether they are below the 50%
annual limit on total deductions.121
For those who believe that the charitable deduction is required as
a matter of income measurement,122 the current design is faulty
because the significant restrictions on deductibility yield an incorrect
measure of income. For those who believe the deduction is a tax
incentive, it is poorly designed because the incentive is limited to a
small number of taxpayers.123 In either case, the fix may be similar:
making the deduction available to more taxpayers.

116. For a discussion of the above- and below-the-line distinction and how it has
changed over time, see Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for
Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005).
117. See I.R.C. §§ 62–63 (2006).
118. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 850–51.
119. See id. at 851–52.
120. As currently structured, the threshold amount disappears in 2010 only to reappear
in 2011. See Rev. Proc. 09-50, § 2.06, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617. The threshold for 2009 was
$166,800. See Rev. Proc. 08-66, § 3.11, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107.
121. Unlike I.R.C. § 170, which permits taxpayers to carryover amounts above the limits,
I.R.C. § 68 contains no carryover provision, so any amounts disallowed are lost for good.
122. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 9.
123. As described below, some argue that the incentive is not underperforming because
those who receive no incentive would nonetheless give to charity. See discussion infra Part V.
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IV. EFFORTS TO REFORM FSA PROVISIONS AND THE CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION
Over the years, numerous efforts have been undertaken to
reform both the FSA provisions and the charitable deduction. To
date, none have succeeded. This Part describes those proposals and
efforts.
A. FSAs
As noted above in Part II, FSAs suffer from two main problems.
First, they are available only to those whose employers offer them, or
approximately thirty-nine percent of the workforce.124 Second, a
shockingly low number of people eligible to participate actually do
so. A wide range of possible solutions exist. Thus, before turning to
the actual attempts to reform FSAs, I first canvass these possible
solutions and the policy implications they present.
There seems to be no principled reason why this tax benefit—not
to mention the exclusion for health insurance generally—is tied to
employment. Congress could easily change this. For instance, as with
IRAs, Congress could allow all taxpayers to open FSAs with financial
institutions and to contribute directly to their accounts. In all other
respects, the plans could work the way they do now. Taxpayers
would deduct amounts contributed to such accounts on their
returns, just as they do now for IRA contributions.125 While nonwork-based plans would not partake of the feature that permits
automatic withdrawal from one’s paycheck, and therefore automatic
exclusion for tax purposes, such a plan would be fairer than the
current rule because all taxpayers could participate.
Expanding FSAs in this manner could be done without altering
the characterization of such plans as insurance under I.R.C. §
106(c)(2) or altering the rule in I.R.C. § 125(d) precluding deferred
compensation. Indeed, removing FSAs from the employment
context and therefore out from under I.R.C. § 125 would open the

124. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 56.
125. One difficulty is that allowing a deduction for amounts contributed to a healthcare
FSA would not account for payroll taxes withheld or paid by the employer. Withheld taxes
could be addressed through the return-filing system quite easily. Accounting for employer-paid
taxes is more difficult. Also, assuming that the irrevocable election requirement were retained,
some enforcement mechanism would need to be developed to deal with taxpayers who
committed to contribute to FSAs yet failed to do so.
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way to allowing rollovers on an administrative basis because the
statutory bar to deferred compensation would no longer apply. The
only question would be whether returning unused premiums or
allowing them to be applied to the next year would be consistent
with the characterization of FSAs as insurance. While this might not
be wise as a business policy, there is nothing in the nature of
insurance that precludes such behavior. Severing the link between
employment and FSAs would also cloud the picture of risk for the
purported insurer because contributions would not stop when the
taxpayer left his or her job. However, the regulations make clear that
these plans must resemble insurance, not match commercially
available insurance in every respect. Thus, the Treasury Department
could require that unused premiums be returned or rolled over to
the next year.
An argument could also readily be made that FSAs and the other
provisions that subsidize health care costs should be eliminated.
Excluding insurance from the tax base increases demand, which can
increase price.126 Insurance also contributes to rising medical costs
because insured persons do not directly bear the costs and so are
more likely to engage in riskier behavior and seek medical care they
otherwise would not. Allowing taxpayers to exclude from income
amounts spent out-of-pocket on healthcare also distorts the decision
to buy insurance by making it less expensive to be uninsured.127
During the 2008 presidential race and the debates over healthcare
reform, there was significant discussion of revoking these
provisions.128 However, Congress decided to leave the current
structure largely intact.

126. See Laura E. Cunningham, National Health Insurance and the Medical Deduction,
50 TAX L. REV. 237, 238, 249 n.57 (1995); Joseph Bankman, John Cogan, R. Glenn
Hubbard & Daniel Kessler, Draft: Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health
Insurance, Presentation at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy
and Public Finance 4–7 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__tax_policy/documents
/documents/ecm_pro_067719.pdf. If good health is a public good, where the beneficiaries
fail to capture all the benefits, the market may undersupply the good from a societal
perspective, and subsidies may be warranted. This is an empirical question that is far beyond
the scope of this article, but many believe this to be unlikely.
127. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and
Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 1485 (1991) (arguing that the most efficient system would be to tax the receipt of health
insurance and to deny a deduction of medical costs).
128. See, e.g., Greg D’Angelo & Robert Moffit, Health Care Reform: Changing the Tax
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A number of reasons may warrant eliminating FSAs on a standalone basis. For instance, FSAs appear to be most effective for those
who have predictable expenses.129 There seems to be little reason to
afford such people a special tax benefit. FSAs may also contribute to
changes in the private insurance markets that require insured people
to shoulder more of the burden of their own healthcare costs.130
While this might be beneficial from a cost containment perspective,
it may unduly burden those who cannot afford to pay more than
they currently do. In addition, one study suggests that the tax
benefits of FSAs are offset by corresponding increases in out-ofpocket expenditures on an individual basis. When the costs of
allowing the tax benefit are factored in, FSAs likely decrease
welfare.131
FSAs functionally allow taxpayers to deduct medical expenses
beginning with the first dollar spent, thereby conflicting with the
policy implicit in I.R.C. § 213, which sets a floor. HSAs accomplish
many of the same goals as FSAs, but without many of the
cumbersome rules. They also create an incentive to purchase high
deductible insurance, which is arguably good because it creates
incentives for people to monitor their spending. As a result, FSAs
may no longer be necessary. Finally, the rules implemented to make
FSAs look like insurance frustrate taxpayers, causing them to spend
significant time trying to estimate their otherwise uninsured medical
expenses, to fail to sign up for or underfund accounts, and to race
out to spend money on unnecessary items or procedures to avoid
forfeiture. Simply put, the game may not be worth the candle.

Treatment of Health Insurance (Webmemo #2344), THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 16,
2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/03/health-care-reform-changingthe-tax-treatment-of-health-insurance; Jeff Liebman, Senator McCain’s New Tax on Health
Insurance, TPMCAFÉ (Oct. 6, 2008, 10:28 AM), http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/
2008/10/06/senator_mccains_new_tax_on_hea/ (describing McCain’s proposal to tax
employer-provided health insurance benefits while giving all taxpayers a $5000 tax credit to be
used to buy insurance).
129. See James H. Cardon & Mark H. Showalter, An Examination of Flexible Spending
Accounts, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 935, 936 (2001).
130. See id. at 953; William Jack, Arik Levinson & Sjamsu Rahardja, Employee CostSharing and the Welfare Effects of Flexible Spending Accounts, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 2285, 2300
(2006).
131. See Jack et al., supra note 130, at 2300. But see James H. Cardon, Flexible Spending
Accounts and Adverse Selection, 77 J. RISK & INS. 145, 146 (2010) (suggesting that health care
FSAs may improve pooling for insurance purposes in a way that leaves both low and high risk
taxpayers better off).
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One could also argue for a change to I.R.C. § 213 to allow
taxpayers to deduct the first dollar of medical expenses, thus
rendering FSAs unnecessary. However, such a deduction would
function as a type of free insurance that distorts the market for
insurance by reducing demand.132 That said, reducing the demand
for insurance could significantly reduce medical expenditures, thus
warranting a deduction for all medical expenditures.133 Indeed, given
that we currently distort the market for insurance by allowing it to be
provided tax-free in the employment setting, excluding amounts
spent on healthcare may actually enhance efficiency by acting as a
countermeasure, at least to the extent it is available to those who get
their healthcare tax free.134
Another proposal would allow a deduction for expected health
care costs, which could be calculated based on the insurance policy
purchased.135 If one’s actual healthcare costs were less than the
expected costs, the taxpayer would get a deduction for amounts not
spent. Conversely, if one spent more than anticipated, no deduction
would be allowed for the excess expenditure. The thought here is
that such a deduction would counteract the tax benefit offered for
employer-provided insurance, while creating a stronger incentive to
monitor health care costs than would an allowance for actual
expenditures.136
FSAs offer three advantages over simply allowing taxpayers to
deduct their actual or expected medical expenses. First, a third party
verifies the validity of the expenses before reimbursing taxpayers,
decreasing the likelihood of cheating.137 Second, the FSAs require ex
ante savings. Third, amounts contributed to FSAs are exempt from
income and payroll taxes. Section 213 of the Code only allows a
deduction against income. As a result, taxpayers are better off

132. See Kaplow, supra note 127.
133. See Bankman et al., supra note 126.
134. See JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY,
WEALTHY AND WISE: 5 STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM ( 2d ed. 2011). Of course,
if health insurance is a public good, it is likely undersubscribed because those paying for health
insurance do not reap all the benefits, thus justifying a subsidy on efficiency grounds. In such a
case, a countervailing subsidy would be ill-advised.
135. See Bankman et al., supra note 126.
136. See id.
137. Of course, numerous other deductions are available simply by listing the
expenditures on one’s return. It is not clear why these types of deductions should be treated
differently.
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excluding income than deducting it. One could amend I.R.C. § 213
to allow an extra deduction to account for payroll taxes to level the
field, but it is not clear how one would handle the employer-paid
portion of those taxes.
To date, there have been no legislative or administrative efforts
either to broaden the availability of FSAs beyond the employment
context or to eliminate them. Instead, legislators and administrators
have attempted to tinker around the edges. For instance, to combat
the problems arising from the use-it-or-lose-it rule, legislators have
introduced eight different bills to allow taxpayers to roll over unused
amounts in their FSAs at year-end. Some have passed the House,
but, so far none has made it all the way through the legislative
process.138
In 2003, the Treasury Department administratively broadened
the appeal of FSAs by treating over-the-counter medications as
eligible expenses.139 In late 2004, apparently frustrated by the lack of
legislative action on the question of rollovers, Senator Charles
Grassley, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, wrote a
letter to the Treasury Department asking whether it could
administratively allow rollovers.140 The Treasury Department took

138. In 2001, Representative Ed Royce, along with seven cosponsors introduced a bill
that would do just this, but the bill died in committee. See H.R. 167, 107th Cong. (2001).
Later that year, he introduced another bill, this time with eleven cosponsors, to the same effect
and with the same result. See H.R. 3105, 107th Cong. (2001). In 2003, he tried again,
garnering twelve cosponsors. See H.R. 176, 108th Cong. (2003). Later that year, Jim DeMint
introduced a bill that allowed carryovers, but limited the amount to $500. This bill garnered
seventy-three cosponsors. Still later that year, Bill Thomas introduced a bill that mainly
addressed Health Savings Accounts. See H.R. 2351, 108th Cong. (2003). During the markup
of this bill, the language suggested by Rep. DeMint was added in. Eventually, a form of this
legislation was included in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003. Unfortunately for proponents of carryovers, this language was dropped from the
final version. See Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
In 2004, Rep. Royce again introduced his bill to allow carryovers, this time
garnering only four cosponsors. See H.R. 4007, 108th Cong. (2004). A similar bill, see H.R.
4279, 108th Cong. (2004), was introduced later that year with 16 cosponsors. It found itself
attached to another piece of legislation, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost Timely
HealthCare Act of 2004. H.R. 4280, 4281, 108th Cong (2004). While the combined bills
passed the House, the Senate did not act on them. In 2005, Royce again introduced his bill to
allow unlimited carryovers. See H.R. 1805, 109th Cong. (2005). He also introduced bills in
2007 (no cosponsors), see H.R. 3306, 110th Cong. (2007) and 2009 (one cosponsor), see
H.R. 544, 111th Cong. (2009).
139. See Rev. Rul. 03–102, 2003-2 C.B. 559.
140. See Treasury Thanks Pension Group for Letter on FSA Restrictions, 2006 TAX NOTES
TODAY, 124–31 (June 22, 2006).
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the position that allowing a rollover would violate the rule found in
I.R.C. § 125 prohibiting deferred compensation and argued that
Congress had effectively ratified its construction of the statute.141
Thus, any efforts to fix this rule would need to come from the
legislature. Nonetheless, in mid-2005, reasoning that a limited
rollover would not implicate the restriction contained in I.R.C. §
125, the IRS allowed taxpayers a 2.5 month grace period for
incurring medical costs beyond the end of a year, provided their
plans allow it.142
As part of the Patient Protection Act, Congress took two steps to
cut back on FSAs. First, reimbursement for over-the-counter
medications will no longer be allowed as of 2011.143 Second, the
maximum amount contributable to an FSA will be set at $2,500 for
2013, with the total amount adjusting thereafter based on
inflation.144 Despite these moves, it is not at all clear that FSAs are
currently disfavored. Congress could easily have eliminated the plans
had it seen fit to do so. Moreover, the upcoming limit far exceeds
the average contributions to such plans,145 so it is unclear what effect
this restriction will have.
B. The Charitable Deduction
When Congress created the standard deduction it was fully aware
that those who chose it would lose the tax incentive to give to
charity. There was significant concern for the financial welfare of
charities; however, those in favor of the proposal reasoned either that
the gain in simplicity was worth the cost or that nonitemizers were
likely to give regardless of whether they received a deduction.
Moreover, because an amount for presumed charitable donations
would be included in the standard deduction itself, nonitemizers

141. See id. The Treasury addressed neither the purported insurance nature of such
contracts nor the notion that allowing rollovers would weaken the argument that healthcare
FSAs were really a form of insurance.
142. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,941 (Aug. 6, 2007);
I.R.S. Notice 05-42, 2005-1 C.B. 1204.
143. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
9003, 124 Stat. 119, 868 (2010).
144. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 125(i) (West 2011) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1403(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1063 (2010)).
145. See MERCER HUMAN RES. CONSULTING, supra note 56; see also INT’L FOUND. OF
EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 5.
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were being treated on par with itemizers, thus defeating any equity
argument.146
Despite losing the debate in 1944, those in favor of a charitable
deduction for all taxpayers continued to push to move the deduction
above the line. They briefly succeeded between 1982 and 1986, until
Congress reinstated the deduction below the line as part of a major
overhaul of the tax system.147 Since then, the push to move the
deduction back above the line has continued unabated. Both
scholars148 and politicians149 have argued for changing the law, citing
both incentive and fairness concerns.150 Some proposals call for
allowing all charitable deductions above the line, while retaining a
sizeable standard deduction.151 Other proposals are more
complicated, employing floors or ceilings on the amount deductible
above the line.152
146. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 850–52.
147. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 172, 196
(1981). For 1982 and 1983, individuals were allowed to deduct 25% of the first $100 of
charitable donations, or $25, above the line. For 1984, the cap increased to $300, for a
maximum $75 above-the-line deduction. For 1985, individuals were allowed to deduct 50% of
their charitable donations with no cap. In 1986, the amount deductible above the line was
increased to 100%. The provision expired at the end of 1986.
148. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 611 (2009) (arguing for an above-the-line
deduction for all charitable contributions); Joseph Cordes et al., Extending the Charitable
Deduction to Nonitemizers: Policy Issues and Options, 7 URB. INST.’S CHARTING CIV. SOC’Y
1, 3 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT], available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310338 (modeling several possibilities).
149. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 854 (describing, among other proposals, President
Clinton’s 2001 proposal to allow 50% of deductions above a certain floor to be taken above
the line and President Bush’s 2001 proposal to allow the charitable deduction to
nonitemizers); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET
PROPOSAL (JOINT COMM. PRINT JCS-3-04 No (I.R.S.)).
150. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 854–56.
151. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at 611.
152. For instance, one proposal called for 100% of all charitable deductions to be allowed
above the line up to the amount of the standard deduction. See Charitable Giving Tax Relief
Act, H.R. 777, 107th Cong. (2001). Another called for nonitemizers to be allowed to deduct
contributions in excess of $1000 ($2000 if filing jointly). See Giving Incentive and Volunteer
Empowerment (GIVE) Act, H.R. 1338, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill would also have
allowed taxpayers to deduct 120% of the amount donated, thus increasing the subsidy beyond
the tax that would have been owed absent the donation. Thus, taxpayers would be better off
from an income tax perspective earning money and giving it away than they would have been
by not earning it in the first place. Another called for allowing a deduction for cash
contributions to charity to the extent such contributions exceeded $500, but not to exceed
$1000 for joint returns. See Charitable Giving Act, H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003). Still another
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A 2000 Urban Institute study modeled four different
possibilities, including (1) allowing deductions of all charitable
donations above the line, (2) allowing itemizers to deduct donations
above the line in excess of $500, (3) allowing all taxpayers to deduct
contributions above the line in excess of $500, and (4) allowing all
taxpayers to deduct donations in excess of a revenue neutral floor.153
Assuming that these proposals had been fully in place in 1995, the
study attempted to predict increased giving and potential revenue
losses. It concluded that, under certain assumptions, the anticipated
increase in giving outweighed the cost.154
A 2002 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report also
considered a number of different proposals to move charitable
deductions above the line.155 Starting with two Bush-era proposals—
a proposal to phase in above-the-line deductions for all donations
and another to phase in a deduction of up to $500 ($1000 if filing
jointly) above the line—the CBO noted that the Treasury and Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated costs ranging from $52.1
to $84.4 billion for the former and $29.3 to $32.6 billion for the
latter, while predicting that giving would likely increase no more
than 4%, or approximately $4.8 billion.156

called for an above-the-line deduction for all charitable contributions in excess of $2000 (for
those filing jointly) for five years, with the floor reducing to $1000 after the five-year period.
See Treasury Explains Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 27–26 (Feb.
9, 2000). In yet another proposal, nonitemizing taxpayers would have been allowed to deduct
$100 ($200 if filing jointly) above the line, with the total amount increasing to $500 ($1000 if
filing jointly). See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2003 REVENUE PROPOSALS 2 (2002).
153. These amounts are for those filing jointly. The floors for those filing singly are half
as much. See Cordes et al., supra note 148. For purposes of the report, the authors assumed
1995 income levels.
154. In situations where this is not the case, it would make far more sense for the
government to make direct grants to charity. For instance, if the government were to collect
$100 million less in revenue but spur only $80 million in additional giving, the government
would be better served by giving $80 million to charity, thus saving $20 million. The study did
not consider whether an investment in charity would produce a commensurate or greater level
of public goods.
155. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ALLOWING NONITEMIZERS TO
DEDUCT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter 2002 CBO REPORT], available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4008/12-13-CharitableGiving.pdf. The report
was prepared at the request of the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee
and provides a history of the standard deduction. It also examines patterns of giving and the
tax incentives provided in the Code.
156. See id. at 5, 22.
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The report also modeled four proposals, including allowing (1)
unlimited above-the-line deductions, (2) deductions up to $100, (3)
deductions above a $250 floor, and (4) deductions up to 2% of
AGI.157 Given the difference in the proposals analyzed, it is hard to
compare the Urban Institute Report to the CBO report, but the
conclusion of the CBO report is that the proposals would not
generate a rise in giving sufficient to justify the costs.158
Whatever the reason, Congress has not enacted any of these
proposals,159 and the charitable deduction remains a blunted
instrument, unavailable to a large percentage of Americans who
either will not or cannot donate sufficient funds to charity to make
itemizing attractive.
V. CHARITABLE FSAS
Assuming that Congress is not simply being cynical in its
decision to offer FSAs and a charitable deduction, it seems
appropriate to try to make these provisions as effective as possible.
Given the repeated failures to reform FSAs by removing the use-itor-lose-it feature and to move the charitable deduction above the
line, it seems clear that another way forward is needed. In this Part, I
propose combining FSAs with the charitable deduction, with the
goal of improving both. In particular, I propose that taxpayers be
allowed to donate any unused funds in an FSA to charity at year-end.
To limit the possibility that this proposal would simply afford a
deduction for giving that already occurs, taxpayers would be allowed
to select only one charity as recipient.160 Plan administrators would
simply forward any money left in such accounts year-end to the
designated charity.

157. See id. at 19.
158. Another important difference between the reports is that the 2002 CBO REPORT,
supra note 155, assumed lower elasticity of giving than did the URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT,
supra note 148.
159. There have also been numerous calls to convert from deductions to tax credits, both
to remedy the upside-down subsidy problem Surrey identified and to allow all taxpayers to
receive tax benefits for donating to charity. See, e.g., Todd Izzo, Comment, A Full Spectrum of
Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371 (1993).
However, to date, this approach has not gained traction either.
160. While giving through FSAs could displace existing giving, the residual nature of the
donation coupled with the fact that one could only give to a single organization make this a
poor substitute for the types of giving in which many engage.
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Not all charities or charitable purposes are created equal, and
some may object to money saved for health care needs going to the
local opera. To address such concerns, Congress could also limit the
types of charities to which donations could be made. Consistent with
the purpose for which the amounts were originally set aside,
Congress could allow taxpayers to designate only health-care related
charities or those that help the poor. Or, Congress could provide
that unused amounts be donated to a fund that would subsidize the
now mandatory health insurance for those who cannot afford it, in
effect creating a charity to receive unused FSA funds.161
Combining these two provisions offers several benefits that the
stand-alone fixes attempted to date do not. From a health care
perspective, if taxpayers know that unused funds will go to a charity
of their choosing—as opposed to their employers’ pockets—they
may be more likely to increase the amount they save for medical
needs. This likelihood includes both a probable increase in the
number of eligible people electing to participate and in the amounts
participants set aside. The proposal would also likely reduce the time
people spend each year determining how much to set aside. For
those who contribute too much, the proposal will likely lessen the
incentive at year-end to spend unused money on unneeded items or
services.
From a charitable-giving perspective, nonitemizers would receive
the functional equivalent of an above-the-line deduction for such
donations. Indeed, it is better than an above-the-line deduction
because amounts contributed to FSAs are not subject to payroll
taxes. Because donated funds will already have been excluded from
income, there would be no need for taxpayers to report the donation
or claim a deduction, thus preserving the simplifying benefits
associated with the standard deduction. It is also likely to be less
costly than moving the deduction—or parts of it—above the line
because, as discussed below, it seems more likely to afford a tax
benefit to new giving than for giving that already occurs.
The remainder of this Part describes how the proposal could be
implemented and then evaluates it from both policy and political
perspectives.

161. Limiting the donations in this way is not necessary and indeed could be counterproductive if taxpayers are disinclined to donate to the allowed charities. I take no position on
whether Congress should limit donations in this way.
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A. Implementing the Proposal
A key benefit of this proposal is that it does not require
congressional action. First, allowing a donation to charity would not
implicate the deferred compensation bar found in I.R.C. § 125(d)
because the donation in Year 2 of amounts contributed to an FSA in
Year 1 should not be considered compensation. Even if it were, the
delay of a few months after the end of the year would no more
constitute deferred compensation than the current rules permitting
taxpayers a 2.5 month grace period in which to spend their FSA
dollars. Second, as noted above, nothing in the nature of insurance
prevents rollovers or the donation of unused premiums to charity.
Thus, the Treasury Department could administratively amend the
rules to allow such contributions without running afoul of I.R.C. §§
106 and 125.
Having said that, the time is ripe for Congress to revisit FSAs
and recharacterize them as tax-favored savings accounts, consistent
with how people view them. From the perspective of most
participants, FSAs operate much the same as HSAs. Participants
contribute their own money to an account and later withdraw it by
submitting receipts for eligible medical expenses. The only
differences in the eyes of most taxpayers is that FSAs are subject to a
number of rules that make them unattractive to use, and FSAs don’t
allow taxpayers to invest the funds as they wish. Most taxpayers
would be shocked to discover that the government views FSAs as a
form of insurance. So long as premiums for FSAs equal coverage, the
formal distinction between FSAs and HSAs is hard to maintain.
Tax-favored savings accounts did not exist when Congress
opened the door for FSAs by creating cafeteria plans, and framing
the accounts as insurance was the only way they could fit within the
then-existing statutory framework. Now that such accounts exist,
Congress can and should reclassify FSAs. Doing so would not only
exempt the accounts from the ban against deferred compensation
found in I.R.C. § 125(d),162 but it would also relieve the Treasury
Department of the need to create and enforce taxpayer-unfriendly
rules necessary to make the plans look like insurance.
In response to the concern that recognizing FSAs as tax-favored
savings accounts would improperly allow taxpayers to deduct their

162. See I.R.C. §125(d)(2)(D) (2006).
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first dollar of medical expenses, in direct conflict with the policy set
forth in I.R.C. § 213 which prohibits deductions below a set floor, I
would note that exempting employer-provided health insurance and
amounts contributed to Archer MSAs and HSAs from income also
contravenes this policy. Insurance payments are nothing more than
ex ante medical costs. Assuming no uninsured expenses, allowing the
first dollar of insurance benefits to be excluded from income is the
same as allowing a deduction for the first dollar spent on medical
needs.163
Arguably, insurance and HSAs are worthy of an exception to the
general policy of I.R.C. § 213 because we want to encourage people
to negotiate for health insurance and buy high-deductible policies.
However, if we classify FSAs as a form of employer-provided
insurance and justify exclusion from income on those grounds, then
the justification for exempting insurance premiums from income
applies equally to amounts contributed to FSAs. If we think of FSAs
as savings accounts, they facilitate the purchase of high-deductible
health insurance by affording a tax benefit for amounts paid up to
the deductible limit, thus encouraging people to monitor their
spending.
B. FSAs
Implicit in the unsuccessful efforts to allow rollovers is the belief
that low participation rates are a result of the forfeiture provision.164
The obvious solution is simply to allow rollovers, but the Treasury
Department has indicated that it feels bound by its prior rulings and
Congressional inaction in light of those rulings. Congress has had
numerous opportunities to act and has refused to do so, suggesting
that a second best solution may be called for, one that either does
not require congressional action or that is more likely to garner
political support.

163. If we were serious about maintaining a floor on the exclusion of medical spending,
we would exempt only those amounts paid for insurance above the floor.
164. People may underfund or decide to pass on FSAs altogether because they are risk or
loss averse or are frozen by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome. Some may refrain from
participating because they believe the hassle of keeping track of medical spending and
submitting receipts outweighs the tax savings. It may be that the combination of these two
issues is really to blame. Unfortunately, no empirical evidence exists on why people refrain
from participating.
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My proposal avoids or at least alleviates the forfeiture penalty
without requiring Congress to act, though legislation adopting the
proposal is the preferred course. For those who regularly donate to
charity, donating unused FSA amounts to charity is nothing more
than an extension of a practice in which they already engage. Such
taxpayers are not likely to see such donations as a forfeiture and are
more likely to fund their accounts consistent with their anticipated
medical needs. If they do not itemize, they will also get a tax benefit
for donating which they currently do not receive. Those who do not
normally donate to charity are more likely to view a donation to the
charity of their choice as better than forfeiting unused amounts to
their employer, though they may view keeping the money to spend
on themselves as better yet and thus not change their behavior in
response to the proposal. Those who give may also receive the
benefits that research suggests come from donating to charity.165
Reducing barriers to FSAs is also consistent with a healthcare
policy aimed at lowering medical costs. Health insurance presents a
moral hazard because people have less incentive to monitor their
medical spending. FSAs lessen the cost of being uninsured or
carrying insurance with a high deductible, thus depressing the
market for insurance.166 Moreover, because FSAs are tied to
employment, the subsidies for FSAs are likely to be targeted at those
who receive health insurance tax-free. To the extent that one believes
the subsidy for health insurance is inefficient because it causes people
to overinsure, expanding the use of this countervailing subsidy could
be welfare-maximizing.
It is important to consider whether the proposal could have
unintended negative consequences. Will employers stop offering
FSAs if they are no longer allowed to keep forfeited funds? The
answer depends on the extent to which companies rely on forfeited
amounts to cover the costs of such programs. Employers potentially
incur two kinds of costs associated with FSAs. The first is
administrative, including internal costs associated with managing
165. See Thomas, supra note 102, at 271–92 (“Social scientists make the connection
between volunteerism (i.e., doing for others) and the cultivation of compassion and civility in
the individual volunteer. This research finds that there are emotional and physical health
benefits that inure to the well-being of the volunteer.”). See generally Lalin Anik et al., Feeling
Good About Giving: The Benefits (and Costs) of Self-Interested Charitable Behavior (Harv. Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 10–012, 2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/
pdf/10-012.pdf.
166. See supra Part II.C.
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enrollment, advising employees, and managing reimbursements. If
the employer retains a benefits company to administer claims,167 it
will incur external costs as well. It is difficult to know how much a
company spends internally on FSAs. Usually, these plans are offered
in conjunction with a variety of other benefits, and it would be hard
to disaggregate marginal costs associated with offering an FSA.
Where companies contract out administration of the program to a
third party, the monthly cost comes to about $3 per participant, for
an annual cost of around $36 for each employee who contributes to
an FSA,168 which is consistent with the fees charged by institutions
that offer HSAs.169
The second kind of cost involves “experience loss,” i.e.,
situations where an employee makes a claim and is reimbursed, and
then leaves the company before he or she contributes the full
amount into his or her account. No data exists on how often this
occurs or how much money is involved. That said, it is hard to
imagine that such losses are significant. The soon-to-beimplemented caps ensure that the loss cannot exceed $2500 for any
one employee.
Relying on the survey results reported above in Part III, it is
possible to estimate the cost of offering an FSA. For instance, if we
assume a company with 2500 employees and a 40% participation
rate,170 that company will have approximately 1000 participants in its
FSA who will contribute $1,300 on average to their accounts, for a
total of $1,300,000. If the company hires an outside firm to
administer the plan, it will incur out-of-pocket costs of
approximately $36,000 in addition to internal administrative costs
associated with the plan. It may also suffer some experience losses
when employees leave mid-year. The total cost of offering an FSA
should be relatively low. For our purposes, let’s assume a total cost,
including internal costs, external costs, and experience loss, of
$50,000.

167. See, e.g., ASIFLEX, http://www.asiflex.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011) (ASIFlex
provides FSA administration).
168. See, e.g., Contract Between Arizona Board of Regents and Application Software,
Inc., at app. A, (setting the rates for 2011 at $3 per month per participant) (on file with
author).
169. See supra text accompanying note 91.
170. This participation rate is double the national average. See supra note 4.
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It is also possible to determine the revenue stream and cost
savings associated with offering an FSA. The data suggests that the
number of people who currently forfeit money and the amounts that
they forfeit are quite low. As noted above, a large majority of
employers report that fewer than 7% of their employees forfeit
money, and the average amount forfeited is less than $100,171
though anecdotal evidence suggests that some taxpayers forfeit
significant sums. If we assume that 5% of the participants at the
company described above forfeit $100, the total amount forfeited
would be $5000. This amount would defray about 10% of the costs
of offering an FSA, suggesting that companies must have other
means available to fund their plans.
One source of funds is the tax breaks that companies receive
from participating in FSAs. Amounts contributed to FSAs are
exempt from both income and payroll taxes.172 Thus, companies do
not need to pay payroll taxes on contributed amounts. The
employer’s portion of payroll taxes is 7.65%.173 Returning again to
our 2500 employee firm, if we assume that the 1000 participants
contribute on average $1300, for a total of $1,300,000, the
company saves $99,450 in taxes. These tax savings far exceed the
costs of administering an FSA, making such accounts financially
attractive to employers, even if the company is not allowed to retain
forfeited amounts. To the extent that employees increase
participation in FSAs as a result of this proposal, the tax savings
should increase. For every $400 in increased participation, the
company would save about $32 in payroll taxes, just about covering
the annual external cost of one participant.
Should tax savings—whether participation remains unchanged or
increases—be insufficient to cover the costs of offering FSAs,
amounts lost as a result of this proposal could be made up through
fees charged to plan participants, as is done with HSAs.174 Indeed,
from an equity perspective, using fees to fund the program would be
an improvement over the current system, as it would apportion the
costs based on a per-person basis and not based on the accuracy at

171.
172.
173.
174.

1080

INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFITS PLANS, supra note 31, at 6.
See I.R.C. §§ 105, 3121(a)(2) (2006).
See I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2006).
See supra text accompanying note 91.
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predicting one’s medical expenses.175 Thus, it seems highly unlikely
that companies will drop FSAs if this proposal is adopted.
C. The Charitable Deduction
Those opposed to moving the charitable deduction above the
line have generally raised five arguments.176 The first is economic.
The second is based on administrative convenience. The third is
based on fairness. The fourth is a concern about the effect on
volunteerism. The fifth is based on efficiency. In this Subpart, I
evaluate this proposal in light of these objections, comparing it to
prior reform efforts where appropriate.
The first objection to moving the charitable deduction above the
line is that it would be too costly.177 At a time of great deficits, one
must be careful not to exacerbate the problem. This argument rings
somewhat hollow in light of the decision to renew the Bush tax cuts
for two additional years, which are projected to add approximately
$3.9 trillion to the deficit over the next ten years.178 However, the
recent fight over raising the debt ceiling suggests that Congress may
be serious about this. Regardless, the question isn’t solely about how
much it costs, but rather whether it produces a net societal gain.
Surprisingly little research has been done attempting to identify the
requisite level or mix of public goods or whether the charitable
deduction as currently structured provides a sufficient subsidy to
produce those goods. At best, the data attempts to predict increased
charitable giving relative to cost.179

175. Using fees is not without risk. Unlike forfeited amounts, which taxpayers may or
may not suffer, fees would be explicit and certain. Some taxpayers might resist participating,
even if on a net basis they benefited from the program. Those who use up all their FSA funds
currently pay nothing for the program. If fees were levied on all participants, they would have
to bear some cost. What effect explicit fees might have on participation is an empirical question
that is difficult to answer.
176. In a 2001 article, Ellen Aprill considered whether moving the deduction above the
line would be in the best interests of religious organizations and society more generally. See
Aprill, supra note 95. While addressed primarily to religious organizations and focused on
donations to such, the article provides a good framework to explore the issue of whether
allowing people to donate unused amounts in health care FSAs to charity might be superior to
moving part or all of the charitable deduction above the line.
177. See, e.g., 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 1.
178. See Ron Scherer, What Will Deal on Bush Tax Cuts Mean for the Federal Deficit?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 6, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2010/1206/What-will-deal-on-Bush-tax-cuts-mean-for-the-federal-deficit.
179. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 148; 2002 CBO REPORT, supra
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Accepting cost arguments as made in good faith, my proposal is
superior to moving the whole deduction above the line because it
limits the total amount of charitable deductions allowed. The actual
impact depends on how people respond to the proposal, but for any
individual the additional above-the-line effect is capped at the
marginal tax rate multiplied by the contribution limit, which will
soon be set at $2500. If the additional incentive does not induce
taxpayers to increase their participation or amounts contributed to
FSAs, the effect on revenue collection would be limited to the small
amounts that are currently forfeited and included in the employers’
tax base. If taxpayers increase their FSA contributions with only their
healthcare needs in mind, the program’s cost will go up, but FSAs
will come closer to fulfilling their purpose. It would be odd to argue
against the proposal because it will make FSAs more effective, in line
with their underlying purpose.180
Finally, some may “take advantage” of the proposal by
intentionally contributing more than their anticipated health care
needs to an FSA with the goal of donating leftover amounts to
charity. Setting aside the fact that this would increase amounts
available for health care if necessary, such behavior would reduce
income tax revenues only if (1) it displaces charitable giving for
which no deduction is currently available,181 or (2) it represents
additional giving. If the proposal spurs additional giving, it will have
accomplished one of its goals. If taxpayers simply shift giving from a
nondeductible to a deductible format, the proposal will have
accomplished little, while decreasing government revenues. The
note 155, at 7–9.
180. Presumably the government could design an incentive with the expectation that few
would take advantage of it, hoping to score political points without actually providing the
advertised benefits. Indeed, some suspect that the Child Tax Credit enacted during the Bush
years partook of this. Legislators could claim they were giving people a credit, all the while
knowing that income limits and the Alternative Minimum Tax would significantly restrict the
number of beneficiaries. In the case of health care FSAs, this seems unlikely, as the prohibition
against rollovers were created by the IRS’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 125’s antideferral rules.
In any event, the better approach is to expressly limit the program to its intended targets,
rather than make the program so cumbersome that people will not participate.
181. Because amounts contributed to health care FSAs are exempt from payroll taxes,
taxpayers who itemize could choose to donate through health care FSAs instead of through
currently deductible giving to avoid paying payroll taxes. This type of behavior would cost the
government tax revenue. However, it would not be difficult to impose payroll taxes on those
who itemize and donate through this mechanism to make such a strategy equivalent to regular
donations. Indeed, to avoid giving nonitemizers an extra tax break, one could readily impose
full payroll taxes on those who donate in this manner.
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likelihood of this occurring is discussed more fully below in the
discussion of efficiency.
A second common objection to moving the charitable donation
above the line is administrative.182 The whole point of the standard
deduction was to eliminate the need to track itemized deductions.
Were the charitable donation moved above the line, many of these
simplification benefits would be lost. Indeed, these concerns were a
leading reason why Congress decided to move the charitable
deduction back under the line as part of the 1986 tax reforms.183
Donating unused FSA amounts to charity would avoid this problem
because the amounts would already have been excluded from
employee income. They would automatically be transferred to
charities at the end of the year. As a result, there would be no need
for employees to document amounts or recipients, thus avoiding
administrative difficulties normally associated with above-the-line
and itemized deductions. For those taxpayers who use the FSA
mechanism to reduce their itemized deductions below the amount of
the standard deduction,184 the administrative burden would actually
decrease.
In an effort to reduce the cost of the charitable deduction,
several of the proposals to date seek to limit the amount of charitable
deductions taken above the line by using a floor or maximum
amount. Such provisions add significant complexity to the Code,
making tax planning difficult. The proposal offered in this Article is
far easier to grasp and plan for.
The third argument is based on fairness, i.e., that it is unfair to
give itemizers an incentive to give, while denying the incentive to
nonitemizers, but this argument is more difficult. Where two people
give the same amounts to charity, it seems wrong that one gets a tax
deduction because he has additional itemized deductions, such as
home mortgage interest, while the other receives no deduction.185
However, some amount for presumed charitable giving is included in
the standard deduction. Thus, while nonitemizers get no direct
incentive to give, their taxes are lowered as if they had given to
182. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 859–60.
183. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 3 (citing Amy E. Dunbar & John
Phillips, The Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: The Case of Nonitemizing
Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 5 (1997)).
184. See id. at 13.
185. See McDaniel, supra note 101, at 394.
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charity. While the exact amount of their donations may not match
the portion of the standard deduction associated with presumed
charitable giving, they are certainly receiving some tax relief, and
those who give little to charity get a greater tax benefit than they
deserve.
Even if they are not financially disadvantaged, nonitemizers
could argue that the current rules are unfair because all taxpayers are
not treated the same. The better path, they might argue, would be
to reduce the standard deduction by some amount and allow all
taxpayers to deduct some or all charitable giving above the line.
However, such an approach would undermine many of the
administrative benefits associated with the standard deduction.
The fourth objection to moving the charitable deduction above
the line is that it might affect volunteerism by making charitable
donations more attractive relative to volunteering.186 This concern is
addressed primarily to churches, which rely heavily on volunteerism
and could suffer if people donate in lieu of volunteering. One who
foregoes income by volunteering has no income and no deduction.
In contrast, a taxpayer who earns money and then donates it to
charity must report the income but gets no corresponding deduction
if he takes the standard deduction. Thus, he is worse off than if he
volunteers. Allowing an above-the-line deduction would put
volunteering and donating on the same footing.
Professor Ellen Aprill rejects this concern, concluding that
donations and volunteering are more likely complements than
substitutes.187 However, to the extent that this concern may have
validity, this proposal avoids the tradeoff to some degree because the
donation is residual, determined as of the end of the year. Volunteers
cannot wait until the last day of the year to decide whether or how
much to volunteer. Thus, it seems unlikely that allowing taxpayers to
contribute unused FSA funds to charity will unduly suppress
volunteering.
Finally, there are a number of efficiency-based objections to
moving the charitable deduction above the line. First, low-income
taxpayers tend to give to religious organizations and do so for
reasons entirely independent of receiving a government subsidy.188
186.
187.
188.
Christian
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They currently donate significant amounts without any subsidy.189
Thus, there is no need for a government subsidy, at least for such
taxpayers. Second, a number of studies suggest that low-income
taxpayers are unlikely to increase their giving when offered a subsidy
because their tax rate is low. In contrast, taxpayers in higher brackets
are much more likely to increase giving in response to greater tax
incentives. Third, because it is not clear the extent to which religious
organizations create benefits for nonmembers, donations to such
organizations may be different in kind from other types of donations
and therefore less worthy of government subsidy.190
As Aprill notes, the evidence on the second and third of these
concerns is contradictory.191 With regard to self-serving donations, it
is simply not possible to determine the societal benefits of donations
to one’s church. However, if one is concerned about this, one could
limit the types of charities eligible to receive unused FSA funds to
those associated with health and medicine, consistent with the
original purpose for setting the funds aside in the first place.
With regard to the relative responsiveness of high- and lowincome taxpayers to subsidies, some studies suggest that low-income
giving is far less responsive than high-income giving,192 because
nonitemizers tend to have low marginal rates, thus blunting the tax
incentives. In contrast, high-income taxpayers are responsive because
they receive significant subsidies for their giving. Other reports find
high elasticity among nonitemizers, suggesting that charitable giving
would surge were nonitemizers given a tax incentive to do so.193
the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 153 (2007).
189. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 8 (“All of the $21 billion in
contributions by taxpayers who claimed the standard deduction were made without any tax
incentive.”).
190. See Aprill, supra note 95, at 865–66.
191. See id. at 859.
192. See John R. Robinson, Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: A
Reappraisal Using 1985 Itemizer and Nonitemizer Charitable Deduction Data, 12 J. AM.
TAX’N ASS’N 39, 58 (1990). For a recent study on high-income taxpayer responsiveness to tax
incentives, see Jon Bakija & Bradley Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives
and Income? Dynamic Panel Estimates Accounting for Predictable Changes in Taxation 7 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14237, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14237.
193. See Yong S. Choe & Jinook Jeong, Charitable Contributions by Low- and MiddleIncome Taxpayers: Further Evidence with a New Method, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 33, 36 (1993);
Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 183, at 18 (relying on data from 1982 to 1986, when
nonitemizers were allowed to deduct charitable contributions above the line). But see, 2002
CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 11 (noting the difficulty of disaggregating timing effects
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Whether the tax incentive for low-income taxpayers is sufficient
to spur additional giving is really something of a red herring. If lowincome taxpayers don’t respond to the incentive by giving more than
they currently give, then the incentive will simply be ineffective.
Instead, the efficiency of any proposal depends on the extent to
which it subsidizes activities that are already taking place. Indeed,
this is the chief problem the CBO identified with the proposals it
considered in its 2002 report.194 The proposal here avoids or lessens
the concerns that the government will be paying for existing giving,
at least relative to moving the charitable deduction wholesale above
the line.
If we assume people contribute more to their FSAs in response
to the proposal, consistent with the actual anticipated medical needs,
it seems likely that any residual amounts donated to charity will be in
addition to existing giving.195 Potentially more troubling is a scenario
where taxpayers fund their FSAs at levels above their anticipated
medical needs with the intent of donating any excess. If such
contributions reflect additional giving, again there is no problem.
However, if taxpayers displace donations they otherwise would have
made but for which no or only reduced tax incentives were available,
the proposal could increase costs without a commensurate increase in
giving.196
While some taxpayers may do this, several elements of the
proposal suggest that donating through an FSA is not a good
substitute for other types of giving, and therefore this may not be as
big a problem as it appears. To begin with, the proposal allows
associated with changes in the law from normal incentive effects); Peter J. Frischmann,
Discussion of the Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: The Case of Nonitemizing
Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 21 (1997) (cautioning against reading too much into the
Dunbar and Phillips findings).
194. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note 155, at 2 (“All four options would be likely to
increase overall contributions by less than 4%, and their primary effect, as is the case with most
deductions, would be to reward taxpayers for their existing behavior.”).
195. Increased funding of health care FSAs should not displace charitable giving because
healthcare expenses will have to be met regardless. Increased use of FSAs simply provides a taxexempt way to do so.
196. In some cases, taxpayers who would otherwise have itemized may elect the standard
deduction if their charitable donations are handled through an FSA. According to the 2002
CBO Report, as of 1997, moving $200 of donations above the line for joint filers could cause
450,000 filers to claim a benefit without changing giving. See 2002 CBO REPORT, supra note
155, at 12. The projected revenue losses from those switching from itemizing to taking the
standard deduction ranged from $50 to $300 million per year, depending on plan considered.
See id.
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taxpayers to designate only one charity as the recipient of unused
FSA funds. Taxpayers who routinely give to more than one charity
would not find this approach adequate. If Congress were to limit the
possible recipients of such funds, the incentive to alter giving
patterns would be even further reduced. In addition, amounts given
through this mechanism are residual. Thus, taxpayers who are intent
on ensuring that their specific charity receives a set amount will be
better served by giving directly to the charity. Further, if one is truly
concerned that a significant number of taxpayers will shift their
giving, one could reduce the standard deduction by some ratio of
the amount donated in this manner, though this would add
additional complexity. Finally, if people do shift their giving patterns
to donate through FSAs, they will necessarily be setting aside money
that could be used for health care needs, consistent with the purpose
of having FSAs.
This discussion brings up one concern that should be addressed:
is there a chance that this proposal could actually decrease charitable
giving? For instance, if taxpayers displace existing giving with giving
through FSAs, there is a risk that they could treat the FSA as a
wasting fund, where charity only receives what is left at the end of
the year. If a taxpayer’s health care needs exceeded expectations,
charity would receive less than anticipated. Several factors suggest
that this is not likely to happen.
First, many people give throughout the year, as requests come in.
Donating residual amounts left in an FSA is a poor substitute for this
practice. Second, the limitation of one charitable recipient would
likely preclude taxpayers from seeing FSAs as a perfect substitute for
their normal charitable giving. Third, and perhaps most important, a
large number of givers are target oriented, establishing at the
beginning of the year how much they intend to give. Those who
give for religious purposes often seek to donate 10% of their income
to charity.197 Such taxpayers are unlikely to reduce the total amount
given to charity because they have an alternate and contingent means
of giving. If they shift some of their charitable giving to the FSA and
discover at year’s end that they have unexpectedly used it to cover
health care costs, they can always adjust the amount of non-FSA
donations to meet their goals. While they may need to wait until the
197. This behavior is consistent with the notion that some portion of nonitemized giving
is inelastic. For a discussion of the Jewish practice of tithing and the origin of the 10% figure,
see Chodorow, supra note 188.
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end of the year to make such adjustments, many taxpayers already do
this.198
D. Political Considerations
In today’s political climate, it is not enough simply to put
forward an idea and show that it advances a policy goal and is
economically feasible. It is also necessary to demonstrate that it has a
real possibility of being enacted. This proposal should garner
significant support among politicians, charitable organizations, and
frustrated taxpayers, while engendering little opposition.
First, the proposal should be popular with politicians, regardless
of their political leanings. Both Republican and Democratic
administrations have sponsored proposals to make the charitable
deduction more widely available by moving at least portions of the
deduction above the line.199 Moreover, both parties have railed
against the complexity of the tax laws and the burdens imposed on
those trying to make sensible economic decisions. Softening the
forfeiture barrier to using FSAs would significantly reduce taxpayer
frustration at a fairly low cost and therefore should be politically
popular. In sum, this is the type of proposal that should receive
bipartisan support—no mean feat in the current political
environment.
Second, the proposal should garner significant popular support.
Not only will it appeal to nonitemizers seeking a subsidy for
donating to charity, but it will also appeal to the millions of
Americans who face the annual frustration of trying to figure out
how much to contribute to FSAs. Third, the charitable lobby should
support this proposal as it is likely to increase charitable giving. This
lobby is well organized and should be a valuable ally in pushing for
the proposal. Working together, these constituencies have a better
chance of getting this legislation passed than they have had working
separately on stand-alone provisions.

198. Indeed, one can predict that target savers may increase their donations. Targets are
normally minimums. Under current rules, once amounts are committed to health care FSAs,
they are sunk costs. Taxpayers who fund their health care FSAs to meet expected medical needs
and then donate unused amounts are no worse off than if they had used the FSA moneys for
medical needs. It is not at all clear that they will cut back other giving in light of their good
medical fortune.
199. See supra Part IV.B.
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The one group likely to oppose the proposal is employers, who
stand to lose the amounts that would otherwise have been forfeited
to them. That said, the total amount forfeited each year for any given
employer is relatively small. Employers who offer FSAs are almost
certainly financially ahead as a result of payroll tax savings described
above. While employers should get some financial incentive to offer
FSAs, the claim that they should get to keep forfeited amounts in
addition to tax savings is less than compelling, especially when
compared to the alternative use of such amounts to fund charities.
Should they somehow be able to demonstrate that FSAs are not
economically viable absent forfeited amounts, introducing fees to
replace such amounts offers a far more equitable means of funding
FSAs. Thus, employer opposition could readily be diffused should it
arise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior efforts to reform the FSA and charitable deduction
provisions—by allowing taxpayers to rollover unused amounts in
FSAs and moving the charitable deduction above the line—have
failed. This Article offers a new way forward. Allowing taxpayers to
donate unused funds in an FSA at the end of the year to charity may
improve the efficacy of both provisions by creating new incentives for
people to donate to charity, while removing, or at least softening,
the risk of forfeiture associated with FSAs. While the proposal could
be implemented administratively, the better path is to have Congress
revisit FSAs and conform their legal status to the way people view
and use them.
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